ARTICLE

OWNING E-SPORTS: PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
IN PROFESSIONAL COMPUTER GAMING

DAN L. BURK†

I.

BACKGROUND .......................................................................... 1537
A. The Games ............................................................................... 1538
B. The Tournaments ...................................................................... 1540
C. The Korean Connection .............................................................. 1541
II. COPYRIGHT ............................................................................ 1544
A. Authorship................................................................................ 1545
B. Window and Text ..................................................................... 1550
C. Functional Constraints ............................................................... 1555
D. Material Constraints.................................................................. 1557
E. The Rules of the Game ............................................................... 1560
F. Games as Systems ...................................................................... 1563
III. ALTERNATE REGIMES ............................................................. 1569
A. Rights of Publicity...................................................................... 1569
B. Neighboring Rights .................................................................... 1573
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 1577
INTRODUCTION
One of the most astounding and largely underappreciated developments
accompanying the recent proliferation of mass-market computer technology
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has been the rise of video gaming.1 From arcade to console and computer
desktop to interactive multiplayer network, the explosion in computer video
games has been spurred by Internet accessibility, whether for downloading
and updating software, tendering payment, or finding and interacting with
other players. The result has been a flourishing new entertainment sector,
with revenues that now consistently rival or exceed that of the established
music and movie industries.2
Among the notable developments associated with the rise in computer
gaming has been the emergence of a small but growing cadre of professional
gamers. Millions of people play computer games as avocation or amusement,
but some exceptionally skilled players are intent on making a living at what
has been dubbed “e-sports.”3 The advent of this new vocation has been
supported and accompanied by the development of a nascent professional
infrastructure with features familiar from the world of physical sports and
entertainment, including tournaments, leagues, fans, teams, team owners,
player contracts, sponsors, and the like.4 Yet many gaps and ambiguities
remain in these supporting institutions, including significant uncertainties
in the law needed to define the formal relationships among the various actors.
In this Article, I consider a fundamental set of legal issues, integral to
e-sports, that concern the ownership and control of rights in player performances. The nature of such competitions presents a new and fairly complex
practical configuration for legal analysis. Analogous questions regarding the
ownership of physical performances have certainly arisen in the past, but
the nature of e-sports generates certain novelties in the analysis. Unlike
physical sports, where player activity is observed and recorded directly for
broadcast and similar dissemination, e-sports competitions are by definition
mediated by computer game software that is itself the subject of various
1 See generally J.C. HERZ, JOYSTICK NATION: HOW VIDEOGAMES ATE OUR QUARTERS,
WON OUR HEARTS, AND REWIRED OUR MINDS 13-23 (1997) (chronicling the timeline of video
game development, from the 1960s through the 1990s); BRAD KING & JOHN BORLAND,
DUNGEONS AND DREAMERS: THE RISE OF COMPUTER GAME CULTURE FROM GEEK TO
CHIC 26-84 (2003) (describing the evolution of the early video game world, from 1961’s Spacewar!
to 1989’s SimCity).
2 See APHRA KERR, THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL GAMES 47-52 & fig.3.1
(2006). Interindustry comparisons are somewhat difficult, depending for example on whether
“gaming” is considered to include both hardware and software sales, but clearly computer game
sales are very substantial. Id.
3 See Michael Wagner, On the Scientific Relevance of eSport, PROC. 2006 INT’L CONF. ON
INTERNET COMPUTING & CONF. ON GAME DEVELOPMENT (2006) (recounting the history of
the term e-sport).
4 See generally MICHAEL KANE, GAME BOYS: PROFESSIONAL VIDEOGAMING’S RISE FROM
THE BASEMENT TO THE BIG TIME 133-47 (2008); T.L. TAYLOR, RAISING THE STAKES: ESPORTS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF COMPUTER GAMING (2012).
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intellectual property rights.5 This characteristic of e-sports adds to the legal
discussion an additional layer of complexity, implicating the interests of
additional rights-holding entities not found in negotiations over competitive performances in physical sports.
I begin by sketching out a few critical features of the emerging e-sports
phenomenon. I then turn to the most salient theory of ownership and
control over such performances, copyright law. E-sports is a worldwide
phenomenon, but a comprehensive study of e-sports copyright across
multiple jurisdictions is not feasible within the confines of this Article;
consequently, my focus here will be on U.S. copyright law. I then turn
briefly to alternate theories of performance rights found in the right of
publicity and in neighboring rights. Again, my focus will be on the law of
the United States, and in the case of neighboring rights, on the potential for
such rights under the newly agreed-upon Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual
Performances.6
E-sports deserves attention, perhaps as a fascinating aspect of the burgeoning computer entertainment industry, but perhaps also as an emerging
computer entertainment phenomenon in its own right. Admittedly, its
social and commercial significance remains to be seen. Even if e-sports does
not become as prominent as anticipated, exploring a new and expanding
entertainment infrastructure is valuable because it highlights both lingering
and emergent difficulties in applying current proprietary rights regimes to
digital media. Analysis of e-sports underscores the issues of user participation, interactivity, and collaboration that are common to information and
communication technology, with which copyright seems particularly
unequipped to deal. The alternative regimes I consider also display related
shortcomings when applied to e-sports, suggesting a pervasive and potentially debilitating set of juridical gaps that yet remain unaddressed in the
context of digital media.
I. BACKGROUND
E-sports encompasses certain practices that are immediately familiar
from physical sports, as well as practices peculiar to digitally mediated
competition. The former, familiar practices encourage comparisons with
physical sports and suggest that the treatment of physical sports under
5 See Brett Hutchins, Signs of Meta-Change in Second Modernity: The Growth of E-Sport and the
World Cyber Games, 10 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 851, 857 (2008).
6 Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, World Intellectual Property Organization,
June 24, 2012, AVP/DC/20, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/avp_dc/
avp_dc_20.pdf.
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copyright and other intellectual property regimes should serve as a guide to
how such regimes might treat e-sports performances. But such comparisons
only hold to a certain point, as a brief survey of e-sports practices demonstrates.
A. The Games
E-sports tournaments employ a variety of commercial game titles; tournament games span a range of formats and organizational conventions,
including both single and team play. Some games depict or mimic physical
sports activities, like the FIFA football (soccer) game.7 This title depicts
team soccer, including the rules used in international professional soccer,
and the display resembles the broadcast of a virtual international soccer
competition. Thus, the display takes a third-person view of the gamer
avatars, the field of play, and the action, sometimes from a close-up perspective, sometimes from a “pull back” perspective.8
Other games, particularly those in the first-person shooter (FPS) genre,
typified by the game Counter-Strike, are oriented toward action or combat
activity.9 FPS games depict an armed character traversing a landscape
punctuated by obstacles and barriers, shooting at, and generally being shot
at by, human or computer-controlled opponents.10 The games are designated “first-person” because the interface is somewhat unusual, generating a
player’s eye view of the action, as would be seen by an individual in the
field of play, rather than an objective bird’s eye or “god’s eye” view of the
game action.11
Yet other tournament games are drawn from real-time strategy games
(RTS), such as Blizzard Entertainment’s StarCraft and StarCraft II.12 In

7
8
9

See, e.g., FIFA 13 (Electronic Arts, Inc. 2012).
Hutchins, supra note 5, at 857.
Counter-Strike, originally released in 1999, actually began as a modification (or “mod”) of
another FPS, Half-Life, created by two Half-Life players. Walt Scacchi, Computer Game Mods,
Modders, Modding, and the Mod Scene, FIRST MONDAY, no. 5, May 2010, http://firstmonday.org/
htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2965/2526. For the newest game in the CounterStrike franchise, see COUNTER-STRIKE: GLOBAL OFFENSIVE (Valve Corp. 2012). For more
information on Counter-Strike and the FPS genre, see Jana Rambusch et al., Exploring E-Sports: A
Case Study of Gameplay in Counter-Strike, SITUATED PLAY: PROC. 3D INT’L CONF. DIGITAL
GAMES RES. ASS’N (DIGRA) 157, 157 (Akira Baba ed., 2007). See also Emma Witkowski, On the
Digital Playing Field: How We “Do Sport” with Networked Computer Games, 7 GAMES & CULTURE
349, 349 (2012).
10 See JASON GREGORY, GAME ENGINE DESIGN 13 (2009).
11 See Witkowski, supra note 9, at 360.
12 StarCraft was originally released in 1998. Kyle Horner, The History of StarCraft, PC
WORLD AUSTL. (July 27, 2010), http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/354647/history_StarCraft.
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these games, which some players compare to chess,13 the player deploys
pieces such as military units to achieve objectives across a broad map.
StarCraft in particular has become a mainstay of professional tournament
play.14 Less popular but still significant are multiplayer or massively multiplayer online role playing games (MMORPGs or MMOs) such as Blizzard
Entertainment’s World of Warcraft titles.15 These depict player characters
competing in scenarios drawn from fictional genres, such as science fiction or
medieval fantasy, with all the spacecraft, aliens, ray guns, dragons, wizards,
and enchanted swords that such milieux entail.16
What is perhaps most striking about this collection of standardized
tournament titles is that they are all relatively old as computer games go. In
an industry characterized by rapid product turnover, where new titles and
frequent updates appear year in and year out, veteran titles such as CounterStrike and StarCraft have long since been overtaken by newer titles.17 This
disjunction perhaps speaks to differing speeds of technological and social
establishment, and differing types of social niches for gaming. New games,
whether electronic or physical, may be quickly adopted by consumers for
personal play; however, professional play in competitive games of any sort
requires some time for the game to become stabilized, for a fan base to
develop, and for the business and vocational infrastructure to accumulate.
New physical sports sometimes enter the Olympic or professional canon,
but not with great frequency, and not immediately with popularity. Some
of the same dynamics are apparent in the e-sports arena.

For the newest game in the franchise, see STARCRAFT II: HEART OF THE SWARM (Blizzard
Entertainment, Inc. 2013). See also GREGORY, supra note 10, at 21.
13 See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 108.
14 See Kalle Jonasson & Jesper Thiborg, Electronic Sport and Its Impact on Future Sport, 13
SPORT IN SOC’Y 287, 288 (2010).
15 World of Warcraft, which grew out of Blizzard Entertainment’s popular Warcraft RTS franchise, was first released in 2004. Mike Fenn, Sex, Plagues, and Violence: 8 Iconic Moments in World of
Warcraft History, DAILY DOT (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.dailydot.com/entertainment/world-ofwarcraft-history-anniversary.
16 See GREGORY, supra note 10, at 23-24.
17 For instance, the top-selling computer game worldwide in 2012 was, in fact, another
Blizzard Entertainment title, Diablo III, which sold nearly three million copies; by contrast,
neither Counter-Strike nor StarCraft came close to cracking the top 100 video games sold that year.
Global Yearly Chart: 2012, VGCHARTZ, http://www.vgchartz.com/yearly/2012/Global (last visited
Apr. 10, 2013). However, Blizzard Entertainment released a StarCraft content expansion in March
of this year. See STARCRAFT II: HEART OF THE SWARM, supra note 12.
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B. The Tournaments
The e-sports industry currently presents a nascent structure that one
team owner has compared to the state of American baseball when the first
vestigial forms of the current team, league, and ownership structures were
emerging.18 Some e-sports teams, leagues, and tournaments have become
relatively stable, while others come and go.19 Business models are in flux,
some gravitating toward the broadcast contract model common in highprofile professional sports; other models gravitate toward Internet-based
viewing and dissemination.20 Some team owners are able to turn a profit,
but by no means the kind of multi-million dollar revenues found in prominent physical sports.21 Professional players are able to make a living, and
some few are able to make a comfortable living,22 but the astronomical
salaries paid in some professional sports are at this time foreign to e-sports.23
Team owners often handle the roles of financier, talent scout, recruiter, and
promoter all at once. Certain support structures have yet to emerge; for
example, T.L. Taylor notes, significantly, that the position of coach, a
pivotal role in most professional sports, has yet to emerge in e-sports.24
Networked video gaming tournaments in the United States began before
the advent of the public Internet, using either local area network (LAN)
connections at the venue or standalone machines.25 Many tournaments are
still organized on the LAN model,26 and console play on Xbox or Nintendo
devices is becoming increasingly common. Nonetheless, the availability of
widespread Internet access has been critical to the development of the esports phenomenon. Players frequently arrange online skirmishes for
practice, and may find new partners or teammates via Internet play.27 Much
of the audience for tournaments “attends” via the Internet.28 While some
18
19
20
21
22

See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 151.
See Jonasson & Thiborg, supra note 14, at 288.
See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 144-45.
Id. at 149, 153-54.
See, e.g., Bruce Wallace, Gamer is Royalty in S. Korea, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at A1
(describing one of the most financially successful StarCraft players); Zemme, Getting Paid and
Sponsorship, The Attitudes of the WoW Gamer, MANAFLASK (Feb. 26, 2013, 01:43 AM), http://
manaflask.com/en/blog/Zemme/356 (“Games such as StarCraft, Warcraft 3 and Counterstrike
have many, many gamers that get paid a substantial amount of money to play the game and enter
competitions . . . .”).
23 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 145 (discussing salary structures in the Major League
Gaming (MLG) league).
24 Id. at 150.
25 See id. at 9.
26 See Hutchins, supra note 5, at 862; Jonasson & Thiborg, supra note 14, at 288.
27 See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 89.
28 Id. at 209.
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matches are televised—primarily in jurisdictions outside the United States,
via broadcast, cable, or pay-per-view channels—more often the fans view
tournaments via online streaming media.29 Indeed, both tournament play
and individual practice sessions are increasingly available via live streaming
through sites such as Justin.tv and Twitch.tv.30
However, not unlike broadcast physical sports, high-profile e-sports
tournament play typically occurs in front of a live audience.31 In addition to
remote viewers who observe the games by digital streaming or other media,
crowds of fans gather to watch the actual tournament players hunched over
their computer keyboards, fixated on the screens before them. Venues for
tournaments range from conventional auditoriums and small stadiums to
makeshift arrays of card tables and folding chairs in hotel ballrooms or even
warehouses.32 Gameplay is typically projected onto a large screen for the
audience to view, although in smaller, local tournaments, spectators may be
found simply looking over player’s shoulders. Audiences sharing the space
with the players can be seen reacting to the progress of the games, engaging
in the cheering, yelling, occasional groaning, jumping, and fist-pumping
that are familiar sights at any spectator arena.
C. The Korean Connection
Although audiences for e-sports are enthusiastic and growing in Europe
and North America, “e-sports” is hardly a household word in most areas of
the world. The current high-water mark for e-sports, that other regions
hope eventually to emulate, is likely found in South Korea, where the
audience seems relatively broad and the institutional infrastructure seems
relatively developed and stable. Korean e-sports have achieved a degree of
recognition and even normalcy.33 E-sports tournaments are fairly regular
and are often carried by television broadcast, including 24-hour cable
channels devoted to e-sports.34 Top players attain a degree of celebrity
status, and the career path for professional players is relatively clear.35
Teams are fielded and sponsored by a wide variety of organizations, including

29
30

Id.
See id. at 171, 200; see also Mehdi Kaytoue et al., Watch Me Playing, I am a Professional: A
First Study on Video Game Live Streaming, PROC. 21ST WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. 1181-88 (Alain
Mille et al. eds., 2012).
31 See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 205-06.
32 See id. at 200-06.
33 See Hyeryoung Ok, New Media Practices in Korea, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 320, 332 (2011).
34 See id.; see also TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 26, 211-12.
35 See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 161-62; see also Wallace, supra note 22.
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branches of the Korean military.36 Team and competition sponsors include
not only predictable high-technology firms such as Samsung, but also firms
such as insurance companies, whose ties to an information technology–
associated sport and audience might be less predictable.
South Korea may present something of a special case for computer gaming
generally and for e-sports in particular. Computer gaming is a widely
accepted and ubiquitous part of everyday life in South Korea, where more
than half of the population regularly participates in some type of computer
gameplay.37 Computer games are integrated into social life; South Koreans
often frequent neighborhood computer game cafes or “bangs,” which may
be owned or sponsored by a particular game publisher.38 South Korean
online activity is further supported by a national technical infrastructure,
including widespread broadband access.39 Indeed, gaming is encouraged by
government technological, economic, and consumer policy, in which it
constitutes a driver to bolster domestic electronics production and a popular
prompt toward consumer electronics purchases.40
Consonant with the role of computer gaming in industrial policy, esports in South Korea is fostered and promoted by the Korean e-Sports
Player Association (KeSPA), a quasiofficial body organized and maintained
with governmental approval.41 Although it is technically a private organization, it has close ties to and official sanction from the Ministry of Culture
and Tourism.42 KeSPA is an important force in South Korean e-sports,
taking the lead in organizing tournaments, providing career guidance for
professional players, and handling aspects of marketing and public relations,
and, most importantly for this discussion, negotiating broadcast agreements
with cable and television outlets.43

36 See id. at 25-26 (noting that both the South Korean Air Force and South Korean Navy
have sponsored their own e-sports teams).
37 See Florence Chee, The Games We Play Online and Offline: Making Wang-tta in Korea, 4
POPULAR COMM. 225, 226 (2006) (explaining what gave rise to the computer gaming phenomenon
in South Korea).
38 See id. at 230-34; Jun-Sok Huhh, Culture and Business of PC Bangs in Korea, 3 GAMES &
CULTURE 26, 32-34 (2008).
39 See DAL YONG JIN, KOREA’S ONLINE GAMING EMPIRE 17 (2010) (noting that, as of 2008,
95% of South Korean households had broadband access, while only 60% of U.S. households did).
40 See Peichi Chung, The Dynamics of New Media Globalization in Asia: A Comparative Study of
the Online Gaming Industries in South Korea and Singapore, in GAMING CULTURES AND PLACE IN
ASIA-PACIFIC 58, 61 (Larissa Hjorth & Dean Chan eds., 2009); Dal Yong Jin & Florence Chee,
Age of New Media Empires: A Critical Interpretation of the Korean Online Game Industry, 3 GAMES &
CULTURE 38, 46 (2008).
41 TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 161.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 25, 161.
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KeSPA also unwittingly provides a glimpse of likely future controversies
in e-sports, whether in Korea or elsewhere. Taylor documents a recent
dispute involving KeSPA and the North American game developer Blizzard
Entertainment.44 Blizzard is perhaps best known as the developer of the
successful MMORPG World of Warcraft.45 But in e-sports, Blizzard is
equally well known as the developer of StarCraft, a science fiction–oriented
strategy game that has become a standard platform for professional tournament competitions. Indeed, Blizzard has built into StarCraft features to
promote and enhance tournament play. In South Korea particularly, StarCraft
has become an important component of e-sports due to collaboration between
Blizzard and KeSPA.46
In 2010, shortly before releasing the highly anticipated StarCraft II,
Blizzard announced that it was preparing to break off relations with KeSPA
due to a dispute over Blizzard’s intellectual property rights.47 KeSPA had
negotiated broadcast agreements for StarCraft tournaments without consulting
Blizzard; Blizzard objected that the agreements contemplated broadcast of
its copyrighted materials without authorization.48 KeSPA publicly took the
position that Blizzard might well be entitled to some deference regarding its
game platform, but that the negotiations really concerned player performances on a platform that had become an industry standard, and not the
platform itself.49 After discussions with KeSPA failed, Blizzard in fact broke

44 TAYLOR, supra note 4 at 162-63. The scholarly literature describing and analyzing World of
WarCraft is immense and growing. See generally WILLIAM SIMS BAINBRIDGE, THE WARCRAFT
CIVILIZATION: SOCIAL SCIENCE IN A VIRTUAL WORLD 10-23 (2010); DIGITAL CULTURE, PLAY,
AND IDENTITY: A WORLD OF WARCRAFT READER (Jill Walker Rettberg ed., 2008); BONNIE A.
NARDI, MY LIFE AS A NIGHT ELF PRIEST: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF WORLD OF
WARCRAFT 27-35 (2010).
45 World of Warcraft boasted, at its height, over twelve million active monthly subscribers,
then earning it the distinction of being the most-subscribed MMORPG of all time. See Mark
Hachman, ‘World of Warcraft’ Tops 12 Million Subscribers, PCMAG (Oct. 7, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2370413,00.asp. Currently in its fourth content expansion, see
WORLD OF WARCRAFT: MISTS OF PANDARIA (Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. 2012), the game sits
at just under ten million active monthly subscribers. Anne Stickney, World of Warcraft Down to 9.6
Monthly Subscribers, WOW INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://wow.joystiq.com/2013/02/07/
world-of-Warcraft-down-to-9-6-million-subscribers.
46 See Jun-Sok Huhh, The “Bang” Where Korean Online Gaming Began, in GAMING CULTURES
AND PLACE IN ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 40, at 102, 106-07; Christian McRea, Watching StarCraft,
Strategy, and South Korea, in GAMING CULTURES AND PLACE IN ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 40, at 179.
47 TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 162.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 167-68 (noting that KeSPA agreed that Blizzard had “a right to a ‘rational level of
usage fee and appeal its support of marketing and promotion for product line-up of Blizzard with
continuous investment such as sharing all contents which belong to KeSPA like pro gamers,
broadcasting, and sponsorship’”).
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off relations with KeSPA and secured a StarCraft tournament broadcast deal
with an alternate licensee.50
The dispute between KeSPA and Blizzard might seem to be a minor
licensing dispute in a far corner of the world, or perhaps an interesting
exercise in sorting the choice of law issues when American game software is
used without authorization on South Korean territory. But Taylor correctly
identifies the KeSPA controversy as the harbinger of disputes to come,
identifying from this incident a series of intellectual property ownership
and control issues surrounding e-sport player performances.51 Particularly
with the rise of live video streaming by players,52 the issues in the dispute
are emblematic of the type of intellectual property problem that will be
fundamental to e-sports anywhere: does ownership of game output, for
broadcast or other purposes, vest with the entity supplying the software
medium or with the player controlling the software? Assuming that similar
disputes will sooner or later arise under American law, we can begin
answering such questions by examining several issues under copyright.
II. COPYRIGHT
Some years ago, in a different context, I offered a brief outline of the
copyright considerations that might go into determining ownership of
player avatars, the visual character representation of players within video
games;53 more recently, I discussed some copyright aspects of gaming performances in a broader sense.54 A handful of other commentators have touched
on these questions as well.55 As Tyler Ochoa points out, the initially
obvious response to such musings is that, whatever the intellectual property
status of player characters and performances might otherwise be, the
question is most often rendered moot by a game’s terms of service (ToS).56
Computer games, including online games, are typically fitted with some
type of adhesion contract that purports to allocate to the game publisher
50
51
52
53

See id. at 172.
See id. at 171-72.
See Kaytoue et al., supra note 30, at 1181-88.
See Dan L. Burk, Electronic Gaming and the Ethics of Information Ownership, 4 INT’L REV.
INFO. ETHICS 39 (2005).
54 See Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Paratext in On-Line Gaming, in EMERGING ETHICAL ISSUES
OF LIFE IN VIRTUAL WORLDS 33 (Charles Wankel & Sean Malleck eds., 2010).
55 See, e.g., W. Joss Nichols, Painting Through Pixels: The Case for a Copyright in Videogame Play, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101, 117 (2007); Tyler T. Ochoa, Who Owns an Avatar? Copyright, Creativity,
and Virtual Worlds, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 959, 991 (2012); see also Erez Reuveni, On Virtual
Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn of the Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 271-75 (2007)
(discussing works of authorship generated within the context of virtual worlds).
56 See Ochoa, supra note 55, at 964-65.
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any copyright or similar rights accruing to the player.57 Sometimes these
contracts appear as “clickwrap”58 when the game software client is loaded
onto the player’s computer; in other cases they may appear as ToS notices
on the game publisher’s website.59 Wherever it appears, the contract would
seem to privately nullify potential disputes over ownership.
But as Professor Ochoa has also correctly pointed out, contracts do not
always settle the question of ownership.60 Contracts may fail for a variety of
reasons. They may be declared unconscionable or void as against public
policy.61 They may be incomplete, failing to specify the disposition of all
the relevant rights, or of all the relevant rights under unforeseen future
circumstances. And, as a more fundamental matter, one cannot begin to
assess whether a contract has successfully conveyed rights without knowing
the nature of the rights purportedly conveyed. Some rights, such as the
moral rights granted in many jurisdictions, are inalienable.62 Indeed, if no
intellectual property interests are generated, either because the player is not
the initial owner or because game activity is not the subject matter of such
rights, there may be nothing to convey.
This question comes to the forefront of analysis in the case of e-sports.
Ownership of casual game performances is largely a moot point, not because
a particular game publisher’s ToS is dispositive, but simply because there is
usually not enough at stake for anyone to seriously challenge it. Players are
often emotionally and perhaps even legally attached to their online depictions,63 but that attachment is seldom monetized, and the cost of clarifying
the rights to the average person’s avatar is likely too high to make the
venture worthwhile. The landscape changes when the performance has
demonstrable worth because the human behind the avatar is a professional
player, who attracts the attention of fans, advertisers, and sponsors; and who
generates revenue for his team and his league by means of his performances.
A. Authorship
The first questions then are what type of work is generated during esports play, and how the copyright statute distributes the rights in that
57 Dan L. Burk, Authorization and Governance in Virtual Worlds, FIRST MONDAY, no. 3, May
2010, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2967/2527
58 Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 495, 495 (2006).
59 Id.
60 Ochoa, supra note 55, at 965.
61 Id.
62 See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United
States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1994).
63 See Burk, supra note 53, at 44.
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particular kind of work. The logical place to look for an answer is in copyright cases dealing with video games. Unfortunately, extant video game
cases that concern player authorship are generally not helpful on the question.
For example, in Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, the Second Circuit considered the question of player contribution in the context of an infringement
suit regarding an arcade-type video game.64 The defendant in the suit, who
produced an allegedly infringing game, challenged the plaintiff’s copyright
on the grounds that players were in fact the authors of the game’s video
output.65 The court, however, reasoned that the players generated only a
variation on the plaintiff’s game, and declined to consider what degree of
player control would be necessary before the game producer would not have
contributed enough to the output to be considered an author.66 Subsequent
courts facing the same issue adopted a similar stance, emphasizing the
limited number of choices available to the player.67
A more recent decision, dealing with a desktop game, may point in a
different direction, although the reasoning is also somewhat suspect. The
dispute in Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc. arose out of authorized additions to a
computer game.68 FormGen, the publisher of the PC game Duke Nukem 3D,
made available to its players the tools to develop alternate game levels that
would provide a more challenging experience beyond those distributed with
the game.69 FormGen encouraged players to share such “MAP” files via a
forum on the company’s web site.70 The instructions in the MAP files
would “call up” and sequence, arrange, and display the electronic source art
library images provided with the game.71 The MAP files thus operated
together with other components of the Duke Nukem game, but could not
themselves independently generate game output.
The alleged infringer, Micro Star, compiled collections of the usercreated MAP files from the web site, and marketed them on compact discs
without either the authorization of the players who created the files or of
the game publisher, FormGen.72 FormGen argued that the MAP files
constituted authorized derivative works that contained expression from

64
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669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
See id. at 855.
See id. at 856-57.
See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 1983); see also
Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982).
68 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1109-10.
71 Id. at 1110.
72 Id. at 1109, 1113.
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their game, giving it standing to sue for infringement.73 Micro Star asserted
that the files incorporated no protected expression from the game, because
they did not entail a concrete or permanent alteration to FormGen’s
original expression, but only instructions for arranging material from the
game library.74
In an opinion by Judge Kozinksi, the Ninth Circuit rejected Micro
Star’s defense, reasoning that the alternate game levels constituted a type of
“narrative” regarding the Duke Nukem character and his story.75 Because
the MAP files dictated the placement and sequence of Micro Star’s graphics,
the court held that they in effect comprised the plot of a new story about
Duke Nukem.76 In other words, by describing the placement and sequence
of game graphics, the MAP files were derivative works incorporating
protected expression from the game.77 Essentially, the opinion held that a
description of a derivative work is equivalent to a derivative work.78 Sequencing and arrangement of the game elements via computer coding was recognized as a derivative work, even if sequencing and arranging of the game
elements via a joystick or game controller was not.
In previous articles, I have argued that despite the somewhat contradictory
holdings of these cases, the question of avatar authorship is probably best
characterized as one of adaptation or derivative work, although the fit of
this doctrine to the interaction of player and game remains problematic.79
Game publishers could be characterized as granting express or implied
permission for players to alter or adapt their audiovisual work, resulting in a
derivative work of the game as it would be executed without player manipulation.80 In a recent detailed analysis of the question, Ochoa has reached
similar conclusions, although he suggests that the best fit between avatar
authorship and the current copyright statute is to view the avatars as
compilations by the players of elements provided by the publisher.81 Ochoa
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Id. at 1110.
See id. at 1110-12.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.; Dan L. Burk, The Mereology of Digital Copyright, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711, 732 (2008).
79 See Burk, supra note 54, at 47. But see Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in
Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1212-15 (1986) (arguing that computer-generated
works are unlikely to constitute derivative works).
80 See Burk, supra note 57.
81 See Ochoa, supra note 55, at 986-87.
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further suggests that the game itself may best be characterized as a collective work, comprising a vast collection of compilations.82
Ironically, avatar creation as such may be far less important to e-sports
than it is to routine gameplay. Some competitive game platforms, such as
Counter-Strike or other FPS games, show little of the player’s in-game
representation.83 Some tournament play may intentionally restrict or
minimize personalization of player depictions to equalize the advantages of
in-game objects such as unique equipment or attributes. It may not be so
much ownership of an avatar as it is ownership of player performance in
general that matters for e-sports. Nonetheless, the analysis of proprietary
interests in avatars can quickly be extended to player control of the game
output generally, which is more likely to be the issue in e-sports.
The question becomes greatly complicated as we look beyond a given
character or avatar representation to extended performances; not merely the
composition and characteristics of a particular avatar, but the sequences of
play involving an avatar.84 Not all game performances include an avatar
representing the player, but all game performances will include suites of
graphic composition somehow controlled by the player. Here again, it
might be argued that all of the elements in a given sequence of game play
are those provided by the developer: the audiovisual work that comprises
the game display presents elements drawn from the coded database of the
game, and presents them in a sequence and in positions defined by the game
code. So, too, sounds of various sorts, generally associated with particular
graphics, are drawn from the game’s sound files. No extraneous graphics
appear in the game display, and all graphics appear at times and places
allowable by the game’s software instructions.
But the same logic that applies to avatar construction applies to game
performance, whether or not an avatar is depicted. Although the game
elements displayed or heard during play are drawn from those provided by
the game designers, the potential number of combinations is enormous. In
controlling the game play, the player makes a large number of selections
including which maps to traverse, what avatar movements to enact, what
objects to interact with or acquire, what nonplayer characters (NPCs) to
engage, and what comments to address to other players. In the kinds of
games common to e-sports tournament play, it is unlikely that the designers
foresaw all or even most of the possible play combinations. Creative players
82
83

See id. at 984.
ERNEST ADAMS & ANDREW ROLLINGS, GAME DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT: FUNDAMENTALS OF GAME DESIGN 242 (2007).
84 See Burk, supra note 57.
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will find combinations of game elements that neither the game designers
nor anyone else could have anticipated; indeed, some player activity will be
in direct contradiction to what the designers intended.
Consequently, I am generally skeptical that the common law test for
joint authorship—an intent on the part of the two authors to create a joint
work85—can be routinely satisfied in the course of game play.86 Game
publishers may know, or even intend, that players play their game, but it is
not clear that this knowledge rises to the level of intent necessary to produce a joint work. I am even more skeptical that this requirement would be
satisfied in the context of e-sports. Game publishers are certainly aware at
some level that professional gamers may be using their products as platforms for competitive play, but the kind of relationships these publishers
may have with regular, nonprofessional players—such as subscriptions, or
even click-through end-user license agreements (EULAs)—are less likely to
be present in the professional context. If the game developer is in contact
with anyone, it is likely to be the league or tournament organizers who vet
and prepare games for competition. In that context, implied permission to
use the game materials for competitive play, leading to the generation of an
authorized derivative work, seems to me the more plausible analysis.
Additionally, looking “internally” at the operation of the game system,87
all these choices and characteristics reside at some level as data recorded in a
constantly changing but durable database that provides both a chronicle and
a constraint on the status of game elements.88 Interaction between the game
client and the server database allows constant updating of the positions of
virtual objects, the movements of the characters, and the status of their
surroundings. It is the record of game status that lends realistic persistence
to the virtual world in which play occurs, so that the display retains the
same state between sessions, and updated states within sessions. Continuous
recording and status updates allow the software to virtually mimic the
consequential, determined character of physical experience.
One might argue that the players are engaged in continual creation of
new database records as play progresses, although this type of analysis has
not necessarily been the approach in past computer game copyright decisions. As a practical matter, copyright law has tended not to differentiate
between computer game code and the audiovisual output of the game,
85
86

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
Cf. Samuelson, supra note 79, at 1221-24 (arguing against joint authorship for computergenerated works).
87 See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO L.J. 357, 359-61
(2003) (discussing “internal” versus “external” modes of analysis for cyberlaw).
88 RICHARD A. BARTLE, DESIGNING VIRTUAL WORLDS 97 (2004).
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treating them as two equivalent manifestations of the same work, as if the
code was a recording of the audiovisual work, rather than a device for
generating an audiovisual work.89 One might adopt the same position with
regard to a computer game and the underlying database—that the audiovisual
work displayed by the game software is merely a different instantiation of
the same work. But this characterization of the game code, problematic as it
was when applied to early arcade games, has become increasingly absurd as
the technology advances. One cannot find the audiovisual work of the game
in the game code.90 The database for a computer game, especially a multiplayer game, contains far more information than is being displayed in any
given player’s performance. Portions of the performance are generated by
the desktop client rather than by the server database. The reasoning of early
cases such as Stern Electronics has broken down.
B. Window and Text
An alternative line of precedent that might be applied to the ownership
of e-sports performances concerns ownership of physical sports performances;
decisions regarding physical performance might in some respects anticipate
disputes over virtual performance. The leading case, Baltimore Orioles, Inc.
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, arose out of a lengthy dispute between
Major League Baseball players and team owners over the control of player
performances in broadcast games.91 The players argued that the broadcasts
infringed the rights of publicity in their public representations and personas.92 Ironically, in order to maintain their claim regarding the right of
publicity, the players were put in the position of denying that their performances constituted copyrightable subject matter.93 The court disagreed on
both counts, first stating in a conclusory fashion that the performances were
sufficiently original to qualify for copyright, and then denying the right of
89 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that
fixation of computer game code constitutes fixation of its audiovisual output); see also U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 61, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
4 (2012), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf (stating that a single registration is
sufficient to protect the copyright in computer code and related screen displays). But see Atari
Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 885-86 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (questioning whether registration
of computer game code is always sufficient to protect its audiovisual output).
90 This has long been a problem with copyright analysis of computer generated output, albeit
exacerbated by the complexity of current game software. See Samuelson, supra note 78, at 1215
(“[C]omputer-generated works do not incorporate recognizable blocks of expression from the
underlying program . . . .”).
91 805 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1986).
92 Id. at 666-67.
93 Id. at 669 n.7.
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publicity claims as preempted by federal copyright protection.94 The court
ultimately held that the broadcasts were copyrightable works, controlled
solely by the team owners.95
A later Second Circuit opinion considering copyright in sports broadcasts, NBA v. Motorola, Inc.,96 took a slightly different position. The case is
significant in several respects that are relevant to e-sports performances, not
the least of which was the court’s rejection of a state misappropriation claim
to control dissemination of facts and statistics concerning basketball
games.97 On its way to deciding the question of control over reporting of
athletic contests, the court stopped to consider the foundational question
regarding copyright in the proceedings of athletic events.98 Although
agreeing that sports broadcasts qualify for copyright, the Motorola opinion99
discounts the suggestion in Baltimore Orioles100 that constituent player
performances meet the standards for copyright.
This conclusion in the Motorola opinion is based on particular assumptions about the nature of copyright authorship and about the nature of
sports broadcasts. The court reasoned that athletic events are not “‘authored’ in any common sense of the word.”101 The court opined that athletic
contests are usually not scripted; that random, unforeseen, and sometimes
surprising occurrences arise out of the contest between players, and that
player action is directed toward winning the contest, not toward artistry or
aesthetics.102 Because practical rather than expressive considerations dictate
player behavior, their actions fail copyright authorship.103 At the same time,
94 Id. at 668, 674. Preemption of such publicity claims is an issue driving a number of key
cases. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 50 F.3d 18, (9th Cir. 1995) (table opinion) (“At the
outset, we wish to make it clear that this is not a preemption case. Plaintiffs’ causes of action are
not preempted by federal copyright law.”). See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption
and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 248-49 (2002) (examining different
preemption rationales for the right of publicity).
95 See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669-70.
96 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
97 Id. at 854.
98 Id. at 846.
99 Id.
100 See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669 n.7.
101 Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846.
102 Id. Although my focus here is on American law, as I have emphasized, e-sports is an international phenomenon, so it is worth noting that this view is not limited to American courts or the
great American pastime; the Court of Justice of the European Union, opining on the copyright in
televised UK rugby matches, reached essentially the same conclusion under EU copyright
directives. See Joined Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. QC
Leisure (Oct. 4, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=110361&
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=51599.
103 See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846-47.
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the court agreed with the Baltimore Orioles finding that video camerawork is
creative enough to qualify for copyright, vesting copyright for broadcast
games in whomever owns or produces the broadcast.104
These cases highlight two important lines of legal reasoning that bear on
the analysis of proprietary rights in e-sports. Tracing the first, we consider
the creative contribution of a director or camera operator to the video
output in a telecast performance. Where performance of physical sports is
concerned, copyright has been sited in the mediated depiction of the
contest—specifically, in video capture or broadcast transmission of sports
gameplay.105 The House Report accompanying the 1976 Act similarly
indicates that a director’s choice of camera angle, focus, editing, and perspective during broadcast would lend copyrightable creativity to sports
video.106 The Baltimore Orioles and Motorola courts relied on this language to
find that copyright attaches to the creative choices made in filming sports—
but not necessarily to the choices made by those depicted in the film.107
This outcome is consonant with the general inclination of U.S. copyright law, which has tended to locate creativity for photographic mediation
in the choices made by a photographer while deploying and operating her
equipment.108 Copyright law excludes facts from its ambit, and to the extent
that photographs record “facts,” one might expect them to be excluded from
copyright. In communication studies, this issue is couched as the inquiry
whether a photograph is a window or a text—that is to say, whether the
photograph simply displays the state of the world for the reader to observe,
as an observer might see by looking through a window, or whether the
photograph is a text that requires interpretation to be understood.109 In the
latter case, designation as a text implies that there must be an author in the
many senses of that word, whose communication is decoded by the reader.

104
105
106
107

Id. at 847.
See id.
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846 (citing Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 669 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986)).
108 See Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of
Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 427 (2004).
109 See, e.g., Chad Vincent Harris, Technology and Transparency as Realist Narrative, 36 SCI.
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 82, 190 (2010); see also Theresa Levitt, Biot’s Paper and Arago’s Plates:
Photographic Practice and the Transparency of Representation, 94 ISIS 456, 457-58 (2003) (discussing
early debates over competing theories of transparency and interpretation in photography). Of
course, even the “window” metaphor entails some assumptions about the passivity of observing
the world through a window; in fact a great deal of interpretation occurs at the retinal and neural
level in the act of observing. See Dan L. Burk, Expression, Selection, Abstraction: Copyright’s Golden
Braid, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 593, 604-06 (2005).
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Copyright law has long tended to answer the window-versus-text question in favor of the latter, defining a photograph as a text with an author—
in copyright it has been the interpretive reader whose presence must be
inferred. Early claims asserting copyright infringement of photographs were
answered with the law’s version of the window interpretation.110 That
approach changed with Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,111 in which
the Supreme Court rejected the argument that photographic technology
simply records facts about the world, and since copyright does not protect
facts, there is nothing in a photograph subject to copyright.112 The Supreme
Court held instead that creative choices made by the photographer—the
posing of the subject, the lighting, the depth of field and speed of exposure—made the photograph a work of authorship rather than a mechanical
record of factual status.113 Recognition of creativity in the work of a cinematographer or director follows the same logic.
But translating this position to e-sports is problematic. Unlike physical
sports, e-sports are always mediated by the software and video apparatus of
the game—a spectator can directly observe football or ice hockey competition, but can only observe Counter-Strike action as computer output.114
Certainly the video game players can be observed directly, but it is not clear
that their physical activity maps onto the role played by physical action in
physical play; generally keyboard strokes and mouse movement are not
what one considers computer “gameplay.” Neither is the unobserved alteration of voltages the players prompt across various circuits a matter of much
interest. Rather, it is the video output they prompt from the machine that
constitutes the activity of interest.
This difference in mediation leaves a question as to who or what, under
a copyright “director’s choice” analysis, might assume the role of an equivalent directorial counterpart in e-sports. Most e-sports games are programmed to “follow the action,” displaying the area of a map that is
immediately relevant to the activity on the screen.115 This perspective will
shift and follow the player’s character as it moves around the field of play.
Generally the depiction is a wide-angle or overhead viewpoint that allows
the player to see not only his own representation, but other nearby features,
NPCs, and avatars that may be relevant considerations to his playing
choices. Some games, such as the FIFA soccer games, may interpose slow
110
111
112
113
114
115

See Farley, supra note 108, at 403.
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
See id. at 58.
See id. at 60.
See Hutchins, supra note 5, at 857.
See ADAMS & ROLLINGS, supra note 83, at 243-44.
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motion replays, views from alternative angles, or cut-away shots in the
fashion of a directed broadcast of a physical match.
Wide-angle or distant views are not the exclusive perspective found in
tournament games, however. In an FPS game such as Counter-Strike, the
perspective of the display follows the perspective of the player; the game
displays the view that an individual would see.116 This field of view changes
as the player makes choices about movement within the virtual environment.117 Indeed, because Counter-Strike is played in teams, the game software will generate five different perspectives on the field of play, depending
on what each player would see based upon their position relative to other
players and persistent objects in the virtual environment.
The mechanics of game viewpoint leave some doubt about the degree to
which the scenes depicted during computer game play can be fruitfully
compared to those of movie or television cinematography. The perspectives
displayed on the game screen are certainly the result of choices by the
player, but generally are not aesthetic choices. They follow automatically
from the playing choices and movements initiated by the player. The
perspective will certainly shift when a player’s avatar is manipulated to
jump, but it is unlikely that a tournament player does so in order to give an
interesting angle to the view on the screen. Typically, the jump is a maneuver
executed to give or gain some advantage in winning the game, and the
output viewpoint follows along according to programmed criteria.118
Additionally, the player’s choices are always dictated at some outer limit
by the parameters of the game software. Whatever view is offered on the
screen, whether chosen for aesthetic or strategic purposes, is necessarily one
afforded by the game’s programmers. Unlike a film or television director,
the player often has no option to pull back for a wide-angle shot or overhead view; rather, the availability of any given perspective has been
predetermined by a programmer. Certainly a film director’s choices are at
some level constrained by the equipment she is using; however, the equipment was likely designed with directorial choice in mind. Additionally,
there is likely no inclination to believe that camera designers are making
authorial choices in crafting a director’s tools—but as we have seen, cases
assessing computer video games do attribute authorial creativity to the game
design that crafts players’ tools.
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See id. at 242-43.
See Witkowski, supra note 9, at 357.
See ADAMS & ROLLINGS, supra note 83, at 244.
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C. Functional Constraints
The interposition of another author—the programmer—into the generation of game performances raises additional issues. The programmer’s
choice regarding perspective may to some extent be pragmatic or utilitarian—
such as to fit certain design elements within the space of the computer
screen—or, in some cases, it may be an aesthetic programming choice,
following the narrative or compositional elements favored by the game
design team.119 The programmer may also be anticipating functional choices
by the player; there may be moments in play where a different perspective
is advantageous or even necessary to a particular game move.
The allocation of copyright may depend upon whether the programmer
is determining, or possibly channeling, player functionality such that the
constraints upon the perspective in the game constitute utilitarian choices.
Copyright law holds that aspects of the work that are imposed or constrained by functional or utilitarian parameters of the medium constitute
unprotectable aspects of the work.120 Such features are conceived as originating, not intrinsically with the author, but with outward, extraneous
influences. This doctrine is presently perhaps most familiar from analyses of
expression in computer software, where assessment of copyright in computer
programs “filters” out those aspects that are dictated by technical requirements such as the specifications of the hardware, demands of interoperability,
and so on.121 A similar principle is found in the test for “useful articles,”
where the utilitarian portion of the article must be either physically or
conceptually separable from the expressive features, otherwise the entire
article is deemed to fall outside of copyright.122
Functionality is a familiar problem in assessing the originality and
expressive content of software and similar works. Software is almost wholly
functional, as it constitutes part of a machine, and so finding nonfunctional
“expression” is problematic. In this regard, it is critical to distinguish useful
or utilitarian works from functional works.123 All copyrighted works have
some use—paintings are useful for decorating the walls, books are useful for
entertainment on an airplane flight, music is useful for soothing the savage
breast. Certain copyrighted works, such as maps or encyclopedias, are
119
120

See GREGORY, supra note 10, at 5-8 (describing the functioning of typical game design teams).
See Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587, 591-92;
Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1932 (2007).
121 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-10 (2d Cir. 1992).
122 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
123 See Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of Computer Software
and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 59-60 (1997).
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primarily or wholly utilitarian in this sense; they are not usually intended to
be artistic or aesthetic works, but instead to convey information.
But software differs radically from maps or encyclopedias. Objections to
software copyright have been periodically met with the argument that
“useful” or utilitarian works, such as maps or dance notation or cookbooks
can fall within the ambit of copyright.124 But such works, however utilitarian
they may seem, are not functionally constrained when they are in “use.”
When a recipe calls for a cup of flour, the person executing the recipe is free
to add a cup of flour according to the recipe, or instead add two cups of
flour, or substitute—probably disastrously—a cup of sugar.125 Software
instructions do not encompass such latitude; if the machine is programmed
to add a cup of flour, a cup of flour will be added. Even if some degree of
latitude is programmed into the machine—to add a cup of flour, or half a
cup, or sugar instead—the program is still limited to those choices. Instructions to a machine are not instructions to a human.
Software copyright cases recognize that a choice imposed by the limitations of the system is not a creative choice, and so may not be an expressive
choice.126 Yet, as I have pointed out in previous work, American copyright
law is heavily invested in the supposition that originality arises from
authorial choice.127 Certain cases assume that choice is itself a proxy for
originality; that free will is fundamental to authorship, so that evidence of
the exercise of unconstrained will becomes evidence of originality.128
Originality thus becomes something that stands outside the causal order of
the universe; expression is only original if it proceeds from the unrestricted
will of the author; that which is dictated by external influence by definition
lacks originality.129

124 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of Copyright
over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2559, 2566 (1994) (claiming that
copyright protects plenty of works that “‘behave’ . . . ‘functional[ly],’” so long as the work is
original and other means of satisfying its purpose are available).
125 See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33, 37 n.3, 41-42 (1987).
126 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992).
127 See Burk, supra note 120, at 605.
128 See id. at 598.
129 Id. at 604.
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D. Material Constraints
Closely related to copyright prohibitions on functionality are those related
to materiality or state.130 Copyright law generally assumes that the features
of creative works that are imposed or constrained by nature constitute
unprotectable aspects of the work.131 This outcome stems again from the
doctrine of originality—characteristics of the work that arise from the state
of the world are not authored; they are deemed not to originate with the
inward expression of a creator, but rather from naturally occurring outward
conditions.132
This is problematic with regard to the medium of a copyrighted work.
Certain copyright cases suggest that variation in the medium of expression,
simply arising from the nature of the medium rather than from authorial
intent, is sufficient to confer copyrightable originality on a work. For
example, in the famous Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. decision,
the question arose as to whether unintentional variations that were created
in the course of producing mezzotints based on public domain works
conferred originality.133 The court found such originality in the stray lines,
idiosyncrasies, and even errors unique to the mezzotint engraver.
But a more recent and arguably more prevalent line of cases appears to
hold quite differently that variations in the medium that arise from the
nature of the medium are not necessarily expression that originates with the
author. Here the decision in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder is illustrative.134
In Batlin, a cast-metal toy “Uncle Sam” bank in the public domain was
taken as the model for an inexpensive mass-produced plastic version.135 Due
to differences in the method and medium of manufacture, the massproduced replicas differed in some minor respects from the cast-metal
original.136 When produced by the injection of polymer plastics into a mold,
certain details of the Uncle Sam figure could not be replicated, or could
only be replicated with less definition.137 When the plastic version of the
bank was itself copied by another manufacturer, the question arose, as in the

130 On materiality and digital media, discussing the material grounding of purportedly immaterial media, see Bill Brown, Materiality, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR MEDIA STUDIES 49
(W.J.T. Mitchell & Mark B.N. Hansen, eds., 2010).
131 See Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion and the Originality Standard of
Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791, 792 n.7 (2001).
132 See id.
133 191 F.2d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1951).
134 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
135 Id. at 488.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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Alfred Bell case, whether anything original had been taken from the replica,
since the replica was based on a public domain work.138
Unlike in Alfred Bell, the court in Batlin held that there was no original,
protectable expression in the first generation copy that could be lifted by
the second-generation copy.139 The differences between the plastic replica
and the cast-metal original were held to be either so trivial as to lack
originality, or to have been dictated by the nature of the manufacturing
process.140 This treatment winnows authorial choice from consequential
outcomes and suggests that, to the extent that a performance is mediated,
we might begin to filter out certain features as originating in the medium
rather than in the author. For example, the physical qualities of media
dictate that a performance will look quite different on videotape as opposed
to 35mm or Super 8 film stock.141 The author may engage in a creative
choice by picking the medium for the work, but once that choice is made,
characteristics arising from the nature or constraints of the medium do not
constitute original expression.
Mechanical constraints that form status conditions of e-sports play
would seem often to fall into the category of such unoriginal material
consequences. For example, if the speed of an avatar’s movement is constrained by the bandwidth of the network or by the processing capability of
the system where a game is being played,142 then it is not clear that the
speed of the displayed performance can be attributed to authorial originality.
Even more likely, if the speed of an avatar’s movement is constrained by
the game software design that is intended to accommodate a particular
bandwidth or data processing speed, the speed appears to constitute a
functional consideration that is unlikely to be considered a copyrightable
aspect of the avatar’s performance.
It is much less clear whether a player’s choice to move an avatar slowly,
in response to or in anticipation of system constraints, creates a performance aspect that might be eligible for copyright protection. The movement is at some level prompted by equipment constraints. However, the
response to the constraint may be original in the copyright sense. The
player in such an instance is working with the materiality and constraint of
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Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 492.
See id. at 488-89.
Cf. LUCAS HILDERBRAND, INHERENT VICE: BOOTLEG HISTORIES OF VIDEOTAPE AND
COPYRIGHT (2009) (discussing the copyright consequences of VHS tape’s physical characteristics).
142 See BARTLE, supra note 88, at 105-06 (discussing synchronization and lag constraints in
game design).
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the system to achieve a certain result.143 Creative authors do this routinely
in material media, working with or around the structure of the substance in
which their expression is fixed: a sculptor may use the naturally occurring
grain of wood or stone to achieve certain effects in the resulting sculpture; a
painter may work the texture of paint or canvas to give a particular visual
effect; a filmmaker may choose the optical quality of a lens or grain of
celluloid to convey a particular cinematic impression.
The materiality of the computer game system is of course known to
experienced players, who may be able to adapt to the qualities of the equipment. Familiarity with the physical affordances of the network can also
accrue to player advantage. For example, Taylor notes that skilled players
may use the lag time inherent in network play to their advantage in adopting particular moves, tactics, and strategies in sophisticated game play.144
Although tournament rules dictate some aspects of player equipment and
interface, there remains considerable latitude for individualized adaptation.145 To the extent permitted by tournament rules, e-sport participants
will often bring to the match their own input devices, such as a familiar
mouse or keyboard, and set these up as their control interface.146 They may
also modify the player interface to a limited extent, for example assigning
certain avatar movements or actions to a particular favored key or button,
rather than to the default key set by original game configuration.147
Avatar movement and game output will be influenced, and sometimes
determined, by the material affordances of the player’s physical equipment,
such as the mouse, trackball, keyboard, or other input equipment. Clearly, the
speed and sophistication of the data processors used in play can affect the
response times and player reactions in the course of a competition. Lag on
the network may cause players to see or react too slowly to game conditions.
Similarly, player commands are conveyed to the equipment by means of the
input devices; once those commands are translated into electrical impulses
they travel across electrical circuits near the speed of light, but initial input
occurs subject to the limitations of mechanical interaction. Certainly a
defective keyboard or sticky mouse can adversely affect play, but players can
adjust to such characteristics if they are familiar. This is evidenced both by
the practice of players to use their own equipment to the extent permitted

143
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Id. at 107.
TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 46-47.
See Witkowski, supra note 9, at 353-54.
Id. at 365.
See id. at 353-54; see also TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 64-65, 77.
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by tournament rules,148 as well as by the tournament rules that prevent too
many substitutions and dictate certain equipment standards.149
Players of physical sports certainly make similar choices in real-world
sports situations—consciously taking advantage of the natural spring of a
baseball or cricket bat, the friction of a clay, grass, or acrylic court surface,
or the curvature of a track.150 Within the rules for equipment standardization, physical athletes may rely on a familiar racket or pair of shoes, customize
a surf board, or tape a handle grip.151 But while it is fairly clear that modern
copyright law would treat an artist’s choice of material—between wood and
stone, or between chisel and brush—as a creative and original choice, the
logic of Motorola dictates that an athlete’s choice would not be so regarded.152
Batlin suggests that even the artist’s choice, if determined by outside constraints, becomes unoriginal.153
E. The Rules of the Game
From this perspective, one possible reading of the Motorola decision is
that physical athletes do not make creative choices, as the proper actions in
sports are imposed by external constraints. But not all such constraints are
uniform; some constraints are physically determined, and others are relatively
arbitrary. The “rules” of the game arise from a variety of convergent
sources.154 A pitcher in baseball is expected to throw the ball into the region
of space in front of the batter that is designated as the strike zone. There may
be penalties for failing to do so, but there is no physical constraint on whether
the pitcher throws the ball through that zone or somewhere else entirely.
Indeed, there might be strategic reasons for missing the strike zone. But
strategic reasons or no, the pitcher is physically unconstrained regarding
this rule of the game; he can throw the ball in any direction he chooses. He
can throw the ball toward first base, or up into the stands, or simply choose
not to throw the ball at all. He can leave the field and go throw the ball on a
different field. Any constraint on his pitching decision is purely cognitive
and persuasive, as this imperative lies within the game’s ruleset.
The same degree of freedom is decidedly not present in the movements
depicted by computer game output. The game may include a very wide
148
149
150
151
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153
154

TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 41-43.
Id. at 63.
See Witkowski, supra note 9, at 365.
See id. at 368.
See supra text accompanying notes 96-109.
See supra text accompanying note 134.
See Sal Humphreys & Melissa de Zwart, Griefing, Massacres, Discrimination, and Art: The
Limits of Overlapping Rule Sets in Online Games, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 507, 522 (2012).
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range of permissible player actions, including perhaps moves that flout the
rules of the game depicted by the software. Players in the FIFA soccer
computer game can move offsides or out of bounds; they are not required to
shoot the virtual ball toward their virtual goal. They can send it in another
direction, including directing it in the wrong direction for the interests of
their team; they can foul another player’s avatar, much as they could in the
physical game. But the range of permissible actions is ultimately circumscribed by the choices embedded in the game software.155 Some actions are
simply not provided for and so are impossible to execute without altering
the software that governs the machine.156
To be sure, where physical games are concerned, unalterable constraints
on player movement exist as well. Clearly physical players are subject to
natural constraints on their motions and activities—some actions in realworld games are simply impossible because they violate the laws of physics
that govern the material world. Players can only jump so far, or run so fast,
or strike so hard. They cannot move through solid objects or move objects
without physical contact. The constraints on movement or action depicted
within the digital game may seem analogous to such constraints of physics
in the everyday world. Certainly all games that depict physical activity will
have some software instruction set that in some sense constitutes the
“physics” of the virtual world depicted in the computer game.157
But the determination of such constraints is largely arbitrary, according
to the design—or the whim—of the programmer. Many games depict
motions, within programmed constraints, that mimic those observed in
everyday life.158 However, the game can equally well be programmed to
depict actions that would be impossible under the physics of the material
world—indeed, many games do precisely this.159 Some of these types of
constraints can, in a sense, be relaxed for avatars in the game; teleportation
or unaided flight or extraordinary strength are commonly depicted as part
of the repertoire of avatar skills in some types of games.160
However much the limitations on output that have been programmed
into the game may resemble the constraints of physics, they are not the
constraints of physics. Neither are the constraints in games depicting
155 See KATIE SALEN & ERIC ZIMMERMAN, RULES OF PLAY: GAME DESIGN FUNDAMENTALS
142 (2004).
156 See ADAMS & ROLLINGS, supra note 83, at 18.
157 BARTLE, supra note 88, at 316-20.
158 See GREGORY, supra note 10, at 595-96.
159 See, e.g., JESPER JUUL, HALF-REAL: VIDEO GAMES BETWEEN REAL RULES AND
FICTIONAL WORLDS 123-30 (2005).
160 See BARTLE, supra note 88, at 324 (dubbing such game mechanics as “ultraphysics”).

1562

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1535

fanciful actions a relaxation of the laws of physics, or a new type of physics.
On the contrary, physical law remains a material constraint on the game
regardless of how the game parameters are programmed: the speed of light
remains an outside limit for the transfer of data; thermodynamics will cause
the machine on which the game is played to generate heat (and very
possibly at some point to overheat); friction and inertia will impede the
movements of mouse, keys, or other input devices. Indeed, video character
movement depends on the physiological limitations of the players: the
uncoiling of visual purple in the retina, the diffusion of acetylcholine across
synapses, the buildup of lactic acid in muscles.161
At this level, as Yochai Benkler reminds us, lifting a catch-phrase from
the science fiction film The Matrix, “[T]here is no spoon.”162 In the movie,
the phrase signified the unrecognized hallucination of falsified physical
perception;163 Benkler redeploys it to remind us of the consensual hallucination of video spaces.164 However much we are inclined to assign to computer
output the virtual depiction of time, space, breadth, and depth, at the end of
the day, there is simply a clever user interface that in conjunction with
the user’s imagination lends artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise twodimensional arrangement of pixels.165 Regarding the output on the screen as
equivalent to physical action on the field obscures the choices that computer
games, not to mention programmers, can and cannot make.
Tournament play adds an additional layer of complexity and constraint
that intersects with the discussion of materiality above. E-sports leagues
161
162

See Witkowski, supra note 9, at 356 (discussing the kinesthetics of e-sports play).
See Yochai Benkler, There Is No Spoon, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL
WORLDS 180, 180 ( Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds. 2006) (emphasis removed).
163 The premise of the movie is thus a variation on the persistent philosophical conundrum
of “brains in vats,” that is, the problem of whether one could discern if one’s sensory inputs reflect
reality or might rather be the manipulations of some advanced, possibly malign, intelligence. See
HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981); Anthony L. Brueckner, Brains in a
Vat, 83 J. PHIL. 148 (1986); A.N. Gallois, Putnam, Brains in Vats, and Arguments for Scepticism, 101
MIND 273 (1992). The thought experiment regarding manipulated sensory input goes back at least
to Descartes’s musings on an “evil genius.” See RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST
PHILOSOPHY 49-50 ( John Vaitch trans., 1901) (1641).
164 Benkler, supra note 162, at 180; cf. WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (describing his
science fiction concept of “cyberspace” as a “consensual hallucination”). On the pervasive
application of spatial metaphors to Internet disputes, see Dan L. Burk, Legal Consequences of the
Cyberspatial Metaphor, in 1 INTERNET RESEARCH ANNUAL: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
ASSOCIATION OF INTERNET RESEARCHERS CONFERENCES 2000–2002, at 17 (Mia Consalvo et
al. eds., 2003); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF.
L. REV. 439 (2003); and Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003). But
see Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007) (critiquing as incomplete analyses of the Internet as a geographical metaphor).
165 Cf. W.S. GILBERT, THE MIKADO act 2 (1911).
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typically impose their own set of rules beyond those embedded in the game
itself.166 As we have seen, these run the gamut from specifications on
hardware and equipment, to prohibitions on certain moves in the game, to
governance of “glitches” or anomalies in the game software that players
might otherwise exploit during the course of the contest.167 Such modifications or moves fall within the determined “rules” afforded by the programmed
parameters of the game software, but for various reasons have been prohibited as unfair, or unsportsmanlike, or detrimental to an interesting and
accessible contest.
Such tournament rules are in essence supplements to the game’s rules of
play and constitute part of a relatively small set of formalized rules governing
playing behavior. Formal rules for play are necessarily incomplete, and
always require “filling in” by means of custom, agreement, or norms such as
“sportsmanship” and “fairness.” Informal shared gaming norms constitute
the vast majority of constraints on player behavior and the major social
constraint on player choice.168 The unwritten rules can of course be ignored
or broken, unlike the laws of physics and without the intentional action of
hacking software constraints. But at some point violating formal rules,
violating normative expectations, and altering the game code strays into the
realm of cheating.169 It is important to note that, on the logic of expression,
such violations are probably creative from a copyright standpoint, since
they effectuate authorial choice—but it is not at all clear that abiding by the
rules is creative, as compliance constitutes acceptance of an outside, and so
unoriginal constraint. Conformity is a choice, but it is arguably less likely to
be an expressive choice.
F. Games as Systems
Software constrains player choice. Physics constrains player choice.
Norms and rules constrain player choice. At the intersection of rules,
physics, materiality, and function lies the objection that computer game
performances may lie outside copyright because of the tradition that
copyright does not encompass “games.” As Bruce Boyden points out, black
letter copyright law has long held that games are uncopyrightable, even
though the individual elements typically employed in games—such as cards,
boards, pieces, and the like—nearly always fall cleanly within copyrightable
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See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 63.
Id. at 63-65.
See id. at 62-63.
See MIA CONSALVO, CHEATING: GAINING ADVANTAGE IN VIDEOGAMES 85-86 (2007).

1564

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1535

subject matter.170 Indeed, at some level, this may constitute the foundation
for the rejection of copyright in player performances in the Baltimore Orioles
case—that the player’s actions were movements in a game, so no copyright
could attach to their participation.
The per se rule excluding games from copyright protection harks back to
the early twentieth century, and is closely related to the now-codified
exclusion of systems and methods from copyright.171 For example, in the
paradigm case Allen v. Academic Games League of America, Inc., a developer
of board games asserted copyright infringement of his right of public
performance due to unauthorized tournament play of his games.172 The
court held that the developer’s public performance right had not been
violated because no infringing performance had occurred, dismissing the
game developer’s assertions with the puzzling declaration that “games are
meant to be ‘played.’”173 This somewhat ambiguous statement says little
about the propriety of copyright in games, but seems to rest on the rights of
game purchasers to play without interference, whether under an implied
license, fair use, or some type of exhaustion. It has nonetheless come to
stand for the proposition that “games” lie outside copyright.
If a “game” is a set of rules or operational methods, then it runs afoul of
the statutory prohibition in Section 102.174 This objection seems a variation
on the argument from physical-or-functional-constraint, but it fleshes out
certain dimensions of the problem. Bruce Boyden argues that the exclusion
makes sense if games are viewed as frameworks for copyrightable content,
rather than as content themselves.175 He argues that traditional games are,
as a general rule, not about the communication of copyrightable content to
players; rather, they set the parameters for play to occur.176 On this view,
games are instructions specifying a certain set of moves or activities that
will produce one of a range of determined results: particular inputs are tied
to particular outputs or results. Relatedly, Boyden suggests that games may
be characterized as “containers” or “shells” into which players can infuse
content, but which are not copyrightable because they lack content in and of
themselves.177
170 See Bruce E. Boyden, Games and Other Uncopyrightable Systems, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV.
439, 445 (2011).
171 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
172 89 F.3d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1996).
173 Id.
174 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); cf. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.
1967) (holding that text describing contest rules is excluded from copyright).
175 See Boyden, supra note 170, at 476.
176 See id. at 477-78.
177 Id. at 442.
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Much of this analysis rests on the argument from communication—that
the rules or sequences constituting the game do not communicate any
message to others. But this argument cannot be quite right. First, as a
doctrinal matter, there is no requirement that copyrightable subject matter
communicate to anyone. Lack of communication to persons was one of the
early objections to copyright in computer operating systems; courts reviewing challenges to computer software copyright quickly concluded that there
is no such criterion.178 So whether a “game” communicates or cannot be an
objection.
Second, it should be fairly clear that games, even if they are “containers”
or “shells,” do communicate. Their difficulty lies rather in the fact that they
constitute systems or processes, albeit communicative systems or processes.
It may be that the particular assemblage of rules constituting the game must be
implemented in order to become meaningful in a particular instance. But the
same might equally be said of many clearly copyrightable forms of expression,
such as dance or poetry. Ballet might be said to constitute a process or
method of dance, specifying certain types and styles of movement—also
comprising a shell or container for conveying expression, rather than
expression itself. Sonnets or haiku certainly provide a methodological
template for construction of poems that might be termed a system or shell
for expression.
When considered at this level, it seems clear that such methods or systems
for expression, that specify schools or classes of expression, constitute genre.179
In the same manner, it follows that the designation “game” specifies, or
designates, a particular form of genre.180 Other genres might include the novel,
the epic, the romance, and even the business memorandum or appellate
brief.181 Indeed, ballet or haiku are certainly typical genres. Although strict
parameters for genre have been elusive, scholars of rhetoric and composition
have characterized genre as entailing a “typified social action” displaying
recurring commonality of form, content, and context, oriented toward a

178 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir.
1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982); Tandy Corp.
v. Pers. Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
179 See JOHN M. SWALES, GENRE ANALYSIS: ENGLISH IN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH SETTINGS 33 (1990); see also Aviva Freedman & Peter Medway, Locating Genre Studies: Antecedents and
Prospects, in GENRE AND THE NEW RHETORIC 1, 9 (Aviva Freedman & Peter Medway eds., 1994).
180 Some commentators have applied genre theory to games in a formal sense. See KERR,
supra note 2, at 38-41. Some of the game categories considered here, such as FPS and MMOs, have
been considered as specific game genres. See id. at 40.
181 See Joanne Yates & Wanda J. Orlikowski, Genres of Organizational Communication: A
Structurational Approach to Studying Communication and Media, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 299, 300 (1992).
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recognized purpose.182 The commonalities of genre are recognized by
members of a discursive community to effect communication.183
Treating works in this way bears some resemblance to the famous “levels
of abstraction” test running throughout copyright analysis.184 By statute and
precedent, copyright is not to protect ideas, but only the specific instantiation
of expression.185 Courts and commentators have had some difficulty separating
this prohibition against copyright in ideas from the prohibition against
copyright in systems and the like.186 There is indeed a relationship, and here
it calls into question the argument from communication; far from lacking a
communicative purpose, genre, or systems of creative work, might be said
to fail copyright because they communicate at too general a level. Genre
might be said in some sense to constitute the “idea” of a particular work,
whereas the particular instance of a genre its expression.
Concluding that a generic system or rubric lies outside of copyright
requires us to tread cautiously with regard to any given instantiation of the
genre. Treating the ballet or sonnet form as an uncopyrightable system does
not tell us whether any particular ballet or sonnet constitutes copyrightable
expression. Thus the holding in Allen187 may speak to the generalized claim
of a game publisher over all performances involving his game, but it does
not speak to the potential claim by the player to a particular performance of
the game. A given instance of choreography or poetry, so long as it meets
the other criteria for copyright, such as originality, can presumably be
eligible for copyright, even if the form of sonnet or ballet is not. Similarly,
concluding that games, or even the structure of specific games, constitute a
type of uncopyrightable system does not necessarily preclude a particular
instance of game play from qualifying for copyright.
The logic of this result in fact fits relatively well with the incentive policy of copyright—rewarding individual creativity while preserving the
opportunity for new forms to enrich the public discourse.188 New genres
arise from imitation of the generalized features of previous creative
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See Carolyn R. Miller, Genre as Social Action, 70 Q.J. SPEECH 151, 156-57 (1984).
See id. at 157.
I have discussed elsewhere the interconnection between such levels of abstraction and
copyright’s functionality doctrine. See Burk, supra note 120, at 594-95; see also Samuelson, supra
note 119, at 1941.
185 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
186 See Burk, supra note 120.
187 Allen v. Academic League Games of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1996).
188 See generally Dan L. Burk, The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First
Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 402-03 (2012) (describing incentive theories for
copyright and similar systems).
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works;189 protection at too general a level would prevent follow-on authors
from working within a certain style, school, tradition, or genre. At the same
time, copyright can protect against literal or even close copying of a particular
instance of the genre. The doctrines of substantial similarity190 and rights
over derivative works191 would permit the exclusion of imitators that mimic
the particularized expression of a given work within a genre—but treating
the genre as a system or method of creation prevents follow-on creators
from being completely excluded from the style or form of expression. We
can grant copyright in the novel Shane while allowing others to write their
own novels in the “western” genre.
If one creator supplies the costumes, make-up, props, and scenery for a
ballet, and performers then maneuver those items through the spatial and
temporal confines of the recital stage, the resulting performance should be
eligible for copyright as an instance of ballet, even if ballet as a dance
specification cannot be the subject of copyright. The same analysis should
follow for a given instance of StarCraft or Counter-Strike play; a particular
sequence of graphics, supplied by the game developer, maneuvered by
players through the spatial and temporal confines of the computer screen
should constitute copyright-eligible subject matter. In fact, ballet may not
be the best analogy in this case, since ballet tends to be tightly choreographed beforehand, and a game of StarCraft will not be. Gaming might be
better compared to some type of improvisational dance in which the
performers choose their steps within a large but finite set of permissible
movements.
The implication of this reasoning is that, if players cannot claim as original certain aspects of their performances, neither can the game developer.
Treating game structure as a system restricts developers’ copyright claims
concerning aspects of player performance that constitute the rules of the
game—bearing in mind that the rules may be difficult to distinguish from
the expression structured around them, and that the rules of a computer
game will go largely unstated, as they are embedded in the game software
itself. The game developer may have specified the rules of the game within
which players compete, but to the extent that those rules manifest themselves in player performance, the developer cannot claim them as original
expression—and of course neither can the player.

189
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Miller, supra note 182, at 157.
3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:78 (2011).
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2002); see also Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of
Copyright’s Derivative Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2138479.
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This leaves then the question as to whether in any instance the content
of the “shell” constitutes copyrightable expression. It may be, as we have
seen, that such content is dictated by function, including the nature of the
medium, such that some or perhaps all of it cannot be. But the answer
cannot depend upon advance preparation, nor on the players’ intent. The
Motorola observation that sporting events have unscripted and undetermined
outcomes192 is undoubtedly correct, yet it is difficult to see how this is
relevant to the question of authorship. Nothing in copyright law requires
that works of authorship be prepared or calculated in advance of fixation.
Improvisational music or dance or theatre, or for that matter impulsive
painting or writing, are not excluded from copyright simply because they
are unplanned or lack premeditation.
Indeed, even where the basic structure of a play, song, or other work is
prepared, inspired and spontaneous additions give individual style to its
performance and are often the mark of artistic genius. It is just such creative
flourishes that add the original expression to make a new version of a public
domain work protectable, or move slavish imitation into the category of
derivative work.193
The converse seems equally problematic. Certain types of sports are
unquestionably scripted in advance—not the contrived theatrics of professional wrestling, but true athletic performances, such as figure skating.
There is no question that figure skating is competitive, and every premeditated movement is intended to garner the highest possible score in a
physical contest. There seems no good reason for excluding a figure skating
routine from recognition as a work of authorship, or, in the alternative, to
exclude it from the category of sports by virtue of its choreography by
designating it as a type of dance. For that matter, there are competitive
tourneys in dance and music and other performing arts. Artistic skill and
competitive intent are not strangers.
Expression, rather than intent, is the proper metric for copyrightability.
Authorship in copyright requires original expression.194 The first requirement is that the expression originates with the putative author.195 There
should be little question that the conduct and movements of athletic event
192
193

NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997).
See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2006). Or, we might add, that addition of such original expression
in a case such as the compulsory license for musical “covers,” could take the new version out of the
scope of the compulsory license into the category of unauthorized infringement. See id. § 115(a)(2)
(authorizing compulsory license for covers of musical compositions so long as the cover does not
change the “fundamental character of the work”).
194 See id. § 102(a).
195 Id.
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participants originate with those participants—they may be repetitions of
past movements or strategies, adapted to a new and changing situation, but
they are certainly selected, sequenced, and executed by the players. No two
athletic games are ever played exactly the same way, and there is no proclivity
to try to reproduce the exact occurrences of previous games. This is copyright originality.
III. ALTERNATE REGIMES
I have to this point focused on copyright as the regime most likely to be
asserted in considerations of control or ownership over e-sports performances.
Copyright is likely to be the lynchpin in any dispute, and a careful analysis
of copyright teases out the peculiarities of computer-mediated performances.
But other proprietary rights will certainly be relevant as well. To fill out the
picture, I briefly consider two additional regimes of proprietary rights that
also bear on ownership and control of such mediated performances: rights
of publicity and neighboring rights. Although doctrinally distinct from
copyright, these regimes sometimes complement and sometimes overlap
with the copyright regime. Each probably deserves a separate article
detailing how it may apply to e-sports, but I include a brief treatment here
to illustrate how the questions of mediation raised in the previous Part also
permeate alternative rights systems.
A. Rights of Publicity
In the United States, state law frequently recognizes a right of publicity
allowing public figures, including athletes and entertainers, to control
commercial exploitation of their likenesses or other distinctive attributes.196
Such rights were at issue in both the Baltimore Orioles197 and Motorola198
cases. Although distinctive identifiers such as names fall under the right of
publicity, applicability of such rights is often clearest when the personal
trait at issue relies on material, usually bodily, portrayal. The applicability
of such rights seems much less clear when the trait or characteristic arises
from technological or other mediated portrayal, potentially impeding the
application of such rights to e-sports.199

196 See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 225, 232-33 (2005).
197 See Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 (7th Cir. 1986).
198 See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997).
199 See Dan L. Burk, Information Ethics and the Law of Data Representations, 10 ETHICS &
INFO. TECH. 135, 139-40 (2008) (discussing the right of publicity vis-à-vis digital personae).
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Certainly physical athletes have been active in asserting rights of publicity
over their computer game representations. One recent example involves a
series of pending class action claims by former NFL players against the
developers of the popular Madden200 football video game.201 The game
offers a virtual simulation of American professional football. The Madden
game includes a feature that allows players to recruit virtual “historical”
teams onto the screen, comprised of avatars with capabilities and statistical
profiles mimicking those of past NFL teams—say, those of the Dallas
Cowboys or Green Bay Packers circa 1969. No actual player names or jersey
numbers are displayed, but the histories of actual players are employed, and
despite the lack of names, the avatars could be connected with past NFL
players by knowledgeable fans (or by those who are willing to do a little
research).202
Evocation of athletes’ identities in online “fantasy leagues” has been
another point of contention.203 Such virtual tournaments depend upon
comparisons of physical athletes’ real-world statistical profiles.204 Athletic
statistical profiles are often distinctive, and may evoke or characterize the
identity of an actual public figure. Many sports fans can quickly name a
player from his or her statistical profile. But it remains unclear whether a
player’s statistical record, without more, constitutes enough of a public
persona to invoke the right of publicity; at least one court has held that bare
numbers are not enough.205
However, these cases are in some sense the inverse of the publicity
question in e-sports; claims by the NFL or other sports figures against game
designers and fantasy sports leagues assert the distinctive identity gained in
physical activity against re-depictions of those characteristics in an audiovisual work. But the potential for right of publicity claims in e-sports would
likely involve an assertion of the distinctive identity gained through virtual
activity in an audiovisual work itself. This is, again, not to lose sight of the
individual behind the video depiction, hunched over a console manipulating
200
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For the latest game in this franchise, see MADDEN NFL 13 (EA Sports 2012).
See Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 10-3328, 2011 WL 2621626, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2011).
Similar litigation involves the representation of current and former college athletes in
video games. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 784 (D.N.J. 2011) (dismissing
right-of-publicity claims brought by a college football player whose likeness was used in video
games because the use of the player’s image was transformative); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 196 (2012).
203 See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007).
204 See Burk, supra note 199, at 136.
205 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1107 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818.
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input devices. But our primary concern here is with characteristics that are
attached to the game output; it is entirely possible that the player has
distinctive characteristics in physical space that would lend themselves to
rights of publicity, but that is for the most part a separate matter from
rights that would confer an interest in a performance.
Players in professional computer gaming often have screen names that
are highly recognizable to their fans—in some cases, these are individual
names such as “Fatal1ty”206 or “Stork;”207 in other cases there may be team
names such as “Fnatic”208 or “Complexity.”209 Often these names are rendered in the distinctive “leet” or “txt” symbolization drawn from SMS or
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) texting, where letters are replaced by numbers of
similar shape or with homonymic pronunciation.210
Physical athletes may be readily identified by a range of characteristics:
by name, by jersey number, by features including build, or sometimes by a
particular slogan, saying, or tag-line. Actors and other artistic performers
are additionally often identified by association with a particular role, or by a
style of dress or costume. These characteristics may not have direct e-sports
cognates. Application of publicity rights to e-sports requires us to consider
what aspects of player identity might be sufficiently distinctive to accrue
rights against commercial exploitation.
The appearance of game avatars may seem a natural place to look for
distinctive characteristics, and the individuality of avatars has been the
subject of considerable commentary.211 However, avatar originality may be
less important to e-sports professionals than it is to casual players. The
ability to tailor representation of the player in play may vary according to
the parameters of the particular game chosen for a tournament. In some
cases, the game may allow a player’s avatar to be sufficiently distinctive so
as to constitute a highly personalized addition to the performance, but in
many other instances, there may be little or no avatar personalization. In
some competitive games, such as FPS games, the player’s representation
will not be seen in the player’s game output, but only from the viewpoint of
206
207
208
209
210

TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 43, 85.
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 235.
On the substitution of letters in computer mediated texts—graphostylistics and neography—
see generally Jannis Androutsopoulos, Language Change and Digital Media: A Review of Conceptions
and Evidence, in STANDARD LANGUAGES AND LANGUAGE STANDARDS IN A CHANGING
EUROPE 145 (Kristiansen Tore & Nikolas Coupland eds., 2011); and Tim Shortis, REVOICING
TXT: Spelling, Vernacular Orthography, and “Unregimented Writing,” in CONNECTED MINDS, EMERGING
CULTURES: CYBERCULTURES IN ONLINE LEARNING 225-47 (Steve Wheeler ed., 2009).
211 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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teammates or opponents. Some games may have no player representation at
all. Other games, as previously noted, may be restricted as to personalization in tournament play.
Thus, the presence of distinctive characteristics may vary depending on
the game in question. In particular, given that much of the playercontrolled representation in e-sports is activity directed toward securing a
win, we might ask whether there is anything sufficiently distinctive about a
player’s game performance to warrant individualized proprietary consideration, or whether all competent performances look the same. Ethnographic
work by Taylor suggests that the answer regarding individuality of performance may be yes; professional players claim to be able to recognize at least
certain other players by their distinctive playing style.212 At the same time,
it may be difficult to support a publicity claim solely on depiction of style;
in one early case, a court dismissed right of publicity claims by a plaintiff on
whose martial arts style a video arcade game had been modeled because his
movements were insufficiently distinctive.213
The difficulty in an appeal to publicity is that computer gaming performances do not directly portray the player, but typically portray some representation associated with the player. Physical athletes may gain much of their
recognition after mediation via television, radio, or print depictions, but the
effort and skill exerted can be and is observed directly in tangible play. Certain
physical performers may gain publicity by a mediated representation—for
example, actors portray characters with which they may become associated.
Typically in such instances courts have said that rights of publicity only vest
when an individual’s natural identity becomes indistinguishable from a
character portrayed.214 This blending seems to occur infrequently, as courts
tend to find that the mediated portrayal, such as a fictional character—
which may be the subject of separate copyright—remains separate from the
persona of the portrayer.215
Thus far, perhaps the closest parallel to virtual representation may be
that from Wendt v. Host International Inc.216 In Wendt, two actors who had
212
213

See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 109-10.
Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40, 41-42 (N.D. Ill. 1996); see also Ahn v.
Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F. Supp 1134, 1136, 1137-38 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding, on the basis of the
Baltimore Orioles decision, that plaintiffs’ right-of-publicity claims to their depiction in the video
game Mortal Kombat were preempted by federal copyright law).
214 See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1994).
215 See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 432 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J., concurring); see
also McFarland, 14 F.3d at 920 n.15 (“We think the case in which an actor becomes known for a
single role such as Batman is different . . . [Adam] West’s identity did not merge into Batman and
[Johnny] Weismuller did not become indistinguishable from Tarzan.”).
216 50 F.3d 18 (9th Cir. 1995) (table opinion).
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appeared on the television series Cheers challenged the inclusion in licensed,
Cheers-themed bars of animatronic figures resembling their television
characters.217 Although the figures were not close likenesses of the actors,
one was depicted as overweight, and the other was dressed as a postman, as
were the characters the plaintiffs portrayed in the television show.218 The
figures were given different names than the television show’s characters.219
It was also clear to the court and to the litigants that the producer of the
show held copyright in the shows and probably in the characters depicted in
the shows.220 The actors claimed the robots were an unauthorized appropriation of their likenesses, implicating California’s right-of-publicity laws.221
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that the actors had at least a colorable
right-of-publicity claim under California law.222
Although the Wendt decision involves something like a virtual representation—animatronic representations of characters played in a television
performance—the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion was strongly premised on the
physical or conceptual resemblance between the figurines and the actors
that would evoke the actor’s public persona.223 Such resemblances that occur
in physical performances may not be present in e-sports performances, as
the performance is not necessarily based on the player’s physical appearance, nor on any physical characteristic of the player. As in the copyright
analysis, the work of the “cyberathelete” is certainly physical, but recognition of that work occurs only after depiction via the game medium.
B. Neighboring Rights
As the holdings in the Baltimore Orioles and Motorola sports broadcast
cases indicate, copyright in fixed performances tends to vest in the individual
capturing or recording the event, not in those who are engaged in the
event.224 The entity responsible for the material fixation tends to be viewed
as the “author.”225 But clearly much of the creative content in a fixed performance arises from the contribution of the performer. Thus it is feasible to
recognize a separate and parallel set of exclusive rights that are granted to
217
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Id. at *2-*3.
Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 811.
Id.
See id. at 810 (explaining the appellants’ cause of action under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344).
Id. at 811-12.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 91-105.
See, e.g., Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n., 805 F.2d 663, 668
(7th Cir. 1986).
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performers rather than to “authors” when their performances are fixed.226
Such “neighboring rights” have long been common in many countries of the
world, such as nations of the European Union, but have not been part of the
American system of intellectual property.227 However, in 2012, the United
States became signatory to a new international treaty harmonizing and
promulgating such rights.228
Although the exact shape that performers’ rights might take under
American law remains unknown until the treaty’s obligations are implemented under domestic law, it would be reasonable to assume that they
would be congruent with the requirements of the treaty. Consequently,
although the treaty raises numerous issues, I will briefly discuss the likely
impact of performance rights as provided under the treaty language on the
concepts drawn out in the previous analysis. In a number of instances, the
treaty could provide separate resolution of questions left unresolved under
copyright or rights of publicity.
The treaty provides for performers in audiovisual works to acquire a
range of exclusive rights controlling the fixation, distribution, and communication to the public of their performances in audiovisual works.229 The
treaty also provides for moral rights of attribution and integrity in audiovisual performances.230 Perhaps most significantly for the discussion of esports, the treaty states, “Performers shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the direct or indirect reproduction of their performances fixed in
audiovisual fixations, in any manner or form.”231 An agreed-upon statement
accompanying the treaty specifies that digital reproductions are specifically
contemplated under this provision.232 Additionally, although contracting
states can limit or opt out of the provisions granting broadcast rights to

226 See Michael Gruenberger, A Duty to Protect the Rights of Performers? Constitutional Foundations
of an Intellectual Property Right, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 617, 631-32 (2006).
227 See George H.C. Bodenhausen, Protection of “Neighboring Rights”, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 156, 157 (1954). Other “neighboring” or “related” rights adjacent to copyright include
performance rights for phonogram producers and broadcasters. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The
Social Costs of Property Rights in Broadcast (and Cable) Signals, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1303, 1309
(2008). Although the concept of neighboring rights for broadcasters is likely relevant to e-sports,
an exploration into this concept is outside the scope of this Article.
228 Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, supra note 6. The Senate has yet to ratify
this treaty. John Langlois, WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances Signed, INTELL. PROP.
BRIEF (June 30, 2012), available at http://www.ipbrief.net/2012/06/30/wipo-beijing-treaty-onaudiovisual-performances-signed.
229 Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, supra note 6, arts. 5, 8, 11.
230 Id. art. 5.
231 Id. art. 7.
232 Id. art. 7 n.6.
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performers,233 in language tracking that of the American copyright of public
performance234 the treaty provides an unqualified exclusive right to performers for streaming or pay-per-view–type transmissions, which are likely
the most pertinent forms of transmission for e-sports.235
As a practical matter, the treaty may be expected to change very little in
the current practices or conventions of established entertainment industries,
such as motion picture production. The treaty provides for most of the
rights it contemplates to be alienable via contract. Aside from a few exceptional performers who may have the market leverage to negotiate other
terms, it seems likely that assignment of the neighboring rights provided in
the treaty will become a routine part of boilerplate in entertainment employment contracts.
But recall that the situation for computer gamers is somewhat different
than that of most performers, at least with regard to the question under
consideration. It may be that e-sports professionals, if they accrue neighboring
rights, will routinely sign such rights over to their team owners, or to a
league, who will negotiate broadcast rights or streaming licenses. Perhaps esports will develop so that players will directly license such rights to
broadcasters. However, our question here has been what rights accrue to
players vis-à-vis game developers—neighboring rights accruing to players
would have to be allocated to the game owner via a separate contract. In the
case of game subscribers, or everyday game purchasers—who might very
well also be covered by the neighboring-rights regime of the Audiovisual
Treaty236—such a contractual transfer might occur by agreement to the
initial EULA or ToS presented before access to the game is granted. But as
already noted, this contract may not be present in the case of e-sports
competition.237
A key question, proceeding from the previous discussion, might be
whether the terms of the treaty apply to player performances in computer
games, given that the treaty seems to have been drafted and negotiated
primarily with cinematic theater actors in mind. As we have noted, gaming
professionals stand in an unusual circumstance with regard to their perfor-
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Id. art. 11.
17 U.S.C § 101 (2006) (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times.”).
235 Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, supra note 6, art. 10.
236 See id. art. 2 (defining performers broadly to include “other persons who . . . play in,
interpret, or otherwise perform literary or artistic works or expressions of folklore”).
237 See supra Section II.A.
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mances. Computer game players never actually appear in the audiovisual
works they create, and although they may be closely identified with their
characters or avatars, the displayed performances by avatars might not be
considered performances by players.
The treaty defines performers as “actors, singers, musicians, dancers,
and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, interpret, or
otherwise perform literary or artistic works or expressions of folklore.”238
Even if e-sports competitors are not conventional actors, they should, at a
minimum, fit into the category of “other persons” who “perform literary or
artistic works.”239 Here e-sports departs from physical sports. Whereas
many of the sports players discussed in the previous section, such as
baseball or tennis players, are probably not performing a literary or artistic
work in the course of competition, e-sports players are unquestionably
generating such a work; indeed, they can only play by generating a literary
or artistic work.
The treaty appears to preempt the question of scripting that was considered in the copyright broadcast discussion above.240 Players of physical
sports may not fall under the treaty language because they are not performing a literary or artistic work. But for those who do perform such works, the
lack of a defined or predetermined script should not be an impediment to
recognizing performance rights. An agreed statement accompanying the
treaty specifies that the performers covered by the treaty include those
engaged in improvisational or unscripted performances.241 Baseball action
may not constitute a literary or artistic work, but this is a different question
under the treaty than lacking a script.
Even with regard to conventional cinema, one would expect the treaty
terms to apply to mediated performances. One might for example ask
whether neighboring rights under the treaty would accrue to puppeteers or
marionetteers—the performance of the puppet character would have to be
recorded as an audiovisual work, but this would not be unusual. It would be
surprising if Frank Oz, who has staged puppet performances before the
camera ranging from The Muppets’ Fozzie Bear to Star Wars’s Jedi Master
Yoda, did not qualify for neighboring rights in the cinematic antics of the
characters he controls.
It is probably worth noting in this regard that the difference between a
multiplayer computer game and a cinematic movie, considered as audiovisual
238
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works, is in the process of diminishing and may before long disappear
altogether. Already a genre of “machinima” has developed, in which the
characters and settings of multiplayer games are used to act out the scripts
for short movies.242 But even on the theatrical side of audiovisual production, much of what is seen in current feature films is computer-generated
graphics, including backgrounds, objects, and character features. Whether
Andy Serkis portraying Gollum in The Lord of the Rings or Mark Ruffalo
portraying the Incredible Hulk in the Avengers, actors in front of green
screens increasingly provide the basis for computer-enhanced or animated
characters. Thus cinema is now to some extent the inverse of computer
games: rather than graphic artists providing visual materials for manipulation by physical players, physical actors provide motion and context for
manipulation by graphic artists. If the terms of the Audiovisual Treaty
cannot be applied to computer game performances, it may be increasingly
difficult to apply them to cinematic theater performances as well.
CONCLUSION
Much of my analysis here has been grounded in the materiality of intellectual property and the tension of such materiality with mediation of player
performance in computer gaming. Copyright assumes fixation in a tangible
medium to which discrete rights can be assigned, but at the same time
excludes from its ambit the functional characteristics inherent in physical
instantiation. Rights of publicity and neighboring rights share this assumption
of physical persona. When the persona, performance, or work becomes
digitized, the conceptual gaps in the relevant legal doctrines are exposed.
Taylor identifies this same tension between the physical and the virtual
as a fundamental quandary for e-sports.243 The culture, practice, and
business of traditional sports are built around the features of physical
location; physical sports teams rely on the geographic loyalty of spectators
that identify with a locally branded team; locations for stadiums and
receipts from spectator attendance constitute important sources of revenue;
construction of such venues is typically dependent on tax and subsidy
benefits from local communities. The way forward for virtual play with a
distributed audience is less clear, leaving the future configuration of e-sports
in some doubt. However e-sports evolves, it cannot adopt quite the business,
242 See Matt Kelland, From Game Mod to Low-Budget Film: The Evolution of Machinima, in
THE MACHINIMA READER 23, 23-35 (Henry Lowood & Michael Nitsche eds., 2011). See also
generally Henry Lowood, High-Performance Play: The Making of Machinima, in VIDEOGAMES AND
ART 59 (Andy Clarke & Grethe Mitchell eds., 2007).
243 See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 209-10.
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social, or legal posture of its physical analogs. Thus, investigation of
proprietary rights in e-sports provides a window not only into an instance
of evolving Internet commerce, but into the conceptual configuration of our
current systems of intellectual property.

